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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1430 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
      
 v. 
 
 PAUL RODRIGUEZ, 
  Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 3-14-cr-00305-007 
Trial Judge: The Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2018 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 26, 2018)                              
_____________________ 
  
OPINION 
_______________________ 
                                         
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Chief Judge 
 After Paul Rodriguez pled guilty to one count of distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine, the District Court sentenced him to a term of 108 months’ 
imprisonment.  Rodriguez appeals, claiming the District Court imposed a procedurally 
and substantively unreasonable sentence by speculating about uncharged criminal 
conduct, improperly weighing the sentencing factors, and declining to recommend drug 
treatment.  Because the District Court did not commit plain error, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Rodriguez was arrested in November 2014 for his involvement in a large-scale 
cocaine and heroin trafficking organization operating out of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.  
A grand jury charged him with one count of distributing and possessing with intent to 
distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one 
count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c).     
 In October 2016, Rodriguez signed a written plea agreement with the Government, 
in which he offered to plead guilty to the drug distribution and possession with intent 
charge in exchange for the Government’s promise to both reduce the amount of cocaine 
involved in the drug charge to more than 500 grams and to dismiss the firearm charge.  
The District Court conducted a change of plea hearing and accepted Rodriguez’s guilty 
plea.  With an enhancement for possessing a firearm and downward adjustments for a 
lack of criminal history and for accepting responsibility, the applicable guidelines 
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sentencing range for the charge to which Rodriguez pled guilty was 108 to 135 months’ 
imprisonment. 
 The District Court imposed a sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment.  This timely 
appeal followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  On appeal, Rodriguez 
claims his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the 
District Court: (1) engaged in speculation about uncharged prior criminal history; 
(2) gave undue weight to the seriousness of his offense while minimizing the mitigating 
factors; and (3) declined to recommend Rodriguez for participation in a prison drug 
treatment program. 
 We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse 
of discretion.  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214–15 (3d Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The defendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.  Merced, 603 F.3d at 214–15; Tomko, 562 
F.3d at 567.  In assessing procedural soundness, we consider whether the District Court 
based its decision on any clearly erroneous factual finding, whether it correctly calculated 
the Guidelines range, and whether it ruled on any motions for a departure.  Merced, 603 
F.3d at 214.  We also determine whether the District Court exercised independent 
judgment and meaningful consideration of the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Id. at 215.  The sentencing factors include, inter alia, the nature and 
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circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the 
need for the sentence imposed to reflect the crime’s seriousness, to afford deterrence, and 
to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 If a sentence is procedurally sound, we then assess its substantive reasonableness 
by considering the totality of the circumstances.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  We afford 
great deference to the District Court’s choice of sentence.  United States v. Lessner, 498 
F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007).  We will affirm a procedurally sound sentence unless the 
defendant demonstrates that no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.   
 Rodriguez failed to present his objections after the District Court imposed the 
sentence.  Accordingly, we review for plain error.  United States v. Flores–Mejia, 759 
F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  To prevail on plain error review, Rodriguez 
bears the burden of establishing that there was an error (i.e., an abuse of discretion), that 
it was plain (i.e., clear under current law), and that it affected his substantial rights (i.e., 
that it affected the outcome of the proceeding).  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
733–34 (1993).  If these requirements are met, then we may exercise our discretion to 
address the error, but only if we conclude that the error seriously affected the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding.  United States v. Andrews, 681 
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F.3d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 
(1997)). 
A. 
 Rodriguez first argues that the District Court committed procedural error and 
deprived him of due process “by selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous factual 
information.”  Rodriguez Br. 16.  Specifically, Rodriguez contends that the District Court 
engaged in “speculation regarding Rodriguez’s criminality,” id. at 15, when it made the 
following observation: “it is highly, highly, highly unlikely—the odds are somewhat to 
winning Power Ball that somebody starts at a level where they are involved with 15 to 50 
kilograms of cocaine.  So that is really concerning and to some extent . . . outlines I 
should say the parameters of your activity in this case.”  JA129–30.   
 To determine whether any error occurred, we must consider the District Court’s 
statement in its full context to determine whether the statement was improper.  United 
States v. Ferguson, 876 F.3d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 2017).  To show plain error, Rodriguez 
must establish that, when considered in context, the District Court not only improperly 
referred to Rodriguez’s criminal history, but also that it relied upon that history in 
fashioning the sentence.  Id.   
 Before making the statement in question, the District Court engaged in a 
thoughtful discussion about the points Rodriguez raised in favor of mitigation.  JA124–
28.  The District Court observed that Rodriguez had submitted twenty-two glowing 
letters from family, friends, customers, and colleagues, demonstrating his commitment to 
his family, his barber shop business, and his community.  JA128.  The District Court took 
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those letters into account, but observed that “there was another side to Paul Rodriguez in 
this case”—the side that participated in “a large scale conspiracy” involving “somewhere 
between 750,000 and two and a half million dollars[’] worth of cocaine.”  JA128.  So 
while the District Court accepted Rodriguez’s commitment to his family, business, and 
community, it also noted the striking scale of Rodriguez’s offense, stating “this is not 
about a first time offense where, you know, I used cocaine or I sold it to somebody down 
the street. . . .  We’re talking about large scale activities.”  JA129.  Indeed, Rodriguez 
stipulated that he was responsible for distributing between 15 and 50 kilograms of  
cocaine, so it is beyond dispute that Rodriguez was involved in “large scale activities.” 
 When the District Court’s “Power Ball” statement is considered in the context of 
its broader discussion contrasting the severity of Rodriguez’s crime with the mitigating 
circumstances, it is apparent that the statement does not reflect that the District Court was 
attributing uncharged criminal activity to Rodriguez.  The District Court expressly 
acknowledged that this was Rodriguez’s first offense, and stated unequivocally that it 
was not attributing any other bad acts to him.  JA129, 132.  In context, the “Power Ball” 
statement reflects the District Court’s skepticism of Rodriguez’s position that, as a first-
time offense, his crime should be dismissed as a minor mistake.  JA131 (“So this was not 
merely a [sic] everybody makes a mistake.  This was a huge colossal high level 
mistake.”).  
 Having carefully reviewed the transcript of the sentencing hearing and having 
considered the District Court’s “Power Ball” statement in its full context, we are not 
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persuaded that the District Court committed any procedural error, and certainly not a 
plain error.  Accordingly, this claim lacks merit. 
B. 
 Rodriguez next argues that his 108-month sentence is unreasonable because, in 
addition to relying on speculation about uncharged past criminal activity (a claim we 
have already rejected), the District Court focused too heavily on the seriousness of the 
offense, the need for deterrence, and the potential for recidivism, and too little on the 
mitigating circumstances and the lesser sentences received by Rodriguez’s co-defendants. 
 Notably, Rodriguez does not contend that the District Court committed procedural 
error by overlooking any mitigating circumstances or by failing to address the § 3553(a) 
factors.  See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (significant procedural error occurs when a court 
“fail[s] to consider the § 3553(a) factors” (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007))).  Indeed, he cannot do so, as the record reflects that the District Court carefully 
and expressly considered Rodriguez’s arguments for mitigation as well as all of the § 
3553(a) factors.   
 As we understand it, Rodriguez’s claim is that the sentence is substantively 
unsound because, although the District Court considered the § 3553(a) factors, it should 
have weighed them differently.  But the District Court’s decision to give the mitigating 
circumstances less weight than Rodriguez believes they deserve hardly renders the 
sentence substantively unreasonable.  Lessner, 498 F.3d at 204. 
 As for the sentencing disparity between Rodriguez and his co-defendants, the 
District Court correctly attributed the difference to the individual circumstances of the 
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respective crimes.  JA135 (“I don’t find there’s any unwarranted disparity in this case at 
all.  I think you were in a different level than some of those people and . . . other factors 
that were incorporated into the guideline calculation for them . . . were not factored in for 
you.”).  Rodriguez concedes that his differing circumstances—particularly Rodriguez’s 
admitted possession of a firearm—explain the increased guidelines range that applied to 
him.  Rodriguez Br. 25–26.  This undermines his claim of substantive unreasonableness, 
because the Sentencing Commission considered the avoidance of unwarranted sentencing 
disparities when it established the guidelines ranges in the first place.  United States v. 
Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 568–69 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 54). 
 In sum, we are not persuaded that “no reasonable sentencing court” would have 
imposed the bottom-of-the-guidelines-range sentence that the District Court imposed 
here.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Because Rodriguez has failed to establish the substantive 
unreasonableness of his sentence, this claim cannot survive plain error review.     
C. 
 Finally, Rodriguez claims that the District Court abused its discretion in declining 
to recommend him for a prison drug treatment program.  Because he identifies no 
procedural irregularity in this regard, we will affirm unless Rodriguez demonstrates that 
the decision is not entitled to our deference because no reasonable sentencing court 
would have done the same thing.  See Merced, 603 F.3d at 214.   
 The District Court considered Rodriguez’s request that he be recommended for 
drug treatment, but declined to make such a recommendation.  It provided cogent reasons 
for that decision, observing that Rodriguez had been drug-free for the past two years, 
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save for a single recent incident involving marijuana.  JA134.  The District Court did not 
recommend against drug treatment, but simply stated that “the Bureau of Prisons can do 
what they see fit” and observed that the drug treatment program is limited in capacity and 
“there are other people in much . . . graver need of that program.”  Id.    
 Rodriguez has failed to identify a single case in which our Court has concluded 
that a failure to recommend drug treatment or a similar rehabilitative program constitutes 
an abuse of discretion.  Given Rodriguez’s relatively minor drug history in the two years 
prior to sentencing, we view the District Court’s decision here as a sound exercise of its 
discretion.  There is no basis to disturb the District Court’s conclusion.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District 
Court. 
 
